Introduction
Human language apparently has the structure and properties expected of a device produced by natural selection (Jackendoff, 2002: chap. 6; Pinker and Jackendoff 2005) . However, we continue to lack a clear theoretical explanation of how or why language evolved uniquely in the human lineage. Equivalently, we have not understood the circumstances under which language might have become adaptive in human ancestors but not in any other of the millions of animal species. Though many theories of language evolution have been proposed in the ca. 150 year since Darwin, none has answered these questions convincingly nor born the fruit expected of a robust theory.
I briefly summarize here a body of new theoretical work which predicts that elite language should evolve uniquely in the human linage. These predictions arise simply, parsimoniously. Moreover, they account economically for all elite human communicative behaviors, not merely speech. This theory also suggests new perspectives on the structure of language and of the mind.
The concept of elite capabilities introduced above is vital. Various constraints impose adaptive trade-offs, resulting in elite execution of one task at the expense of merely serviceable (or negligible) capacity for another. For example, dolphins and horses are both mammals that can swim. Dolphins are elite swimmers but horses are not. All animals can (ostensibly; below) exchange information using symbolic, combinatorially generated and parsed gestures (manual/physical or vocal). Humans have elite skill at such exchanges, while no other animals (apparently) do. The goal of this chapter is a coherent theory of the evolution of this elite human adaptive capability.
I outline this new theory in the first portion of the chapter and synopsize several of its implications in the second.
Non-human animal communication as a social behavior --prelude to language as an element of uniquely human social cooperation
Non-human animals exchange information --they communicate. For example, some moths use a sophisticated pheromone/receptor system to permit males to find females for mating. Further, for example, the members of a school of fish or flock of birds can move with such coordination that they produce an intense gestalt of a single "organism". Finally, young mammals receive elaborately detailed cultural traditions from their mothers as they grow to independence.
1 What (if anything) is unique about human communication that might explain our evolution of language? I will argue that the answer is straightforward. Evolution of non-human animal communication is constrained by the same universal factor that limits all social cooperation in all animals at all times, conflicts of interest. Conflicts of interest are apparently as central to social behavior as gravity is to cosmology. Evolved social behavior, including the exchange of information, is apparently directly determined by conflicts of interest and their management.
In contrast to non-human animals, humans have evolved (uniquely) the capacity to manage these conflicts of interest, creating an entirely new opportunity for adaptive exchange of very large amounts of information. On this theory, uniquely human language (sensu stricto) is merely one sub-element of the massive evolutionary redeployment of ancestral animal assets in response to this well-defined new opportunity for adaptive information exchange.
In the remainder of this section I will synopsize the extensive body of empirical evidence that conflicts of interest are, indeed, the sole limitation on the evolution of animal communication. This lays the vital groundwork for understanding the proposed, uniquely human solution to the universal conflict of interest problem and the implications of this solution to the evolution of human language.
The theory reviewed here is built on one of the approaches to genetic evolution widely accepted in one of contemporary evolutionary biology's major subcultures (Hamilton 1964 a, b; Williams 1966; Maynard Smith, 1982; Dawkins, 1976 Dawkins, , 1986 Dawkins, and 1996 . The following is a brief review of the vital issues for those unaccustomed to thinking about the evolutionary logic of animal social behavior.
[Biological sophisticates can skip to the last seven paragraphs of this section.] Genetic design information builds organisms. Organisms replicate this design information by reproduction. The power of exponential population growth implicit in biological reproduction engenders intense competition (the Malthusian constraint) between members of the same species (conspecifics) for reproduction. Genetic design information that builds organisms who win this competition consistently over many generations lives on; alternative forms of design information are lost.
Genetic design information can "win" this Malthusian "game" in a variety of ways. It can build organisms that reproduce especially efficiently. Alternatively, design information can build organisms that assist in the reproduction of other conspecific organisms built by the same version of design information. In practice in the world of real animals, this second, alternative strategy almost always implies assisting close genetic kin (parents, siblings, offspring) in ways that support their reproduction. This assistance of close kin often includes the exchange of "cultural" information about the world (below).
Some individual members of some species use one or the other of these two alternative reproductive strategies exclusively. More commonly, individuals use a combination of the two strategies --personal reproduction and (sometimes) assistance of close kin in their efforts to reproduce.
As a result of this suite of strategic objectives/constraints, individual animals will normally behave as if the following statements about the world were true.
First, the "interests" of the design information that builds individual organisms (for the "purpose" of replicating that design information) are paramount. Of course, genetic design information (DNA sequence information) is "inanimate" and has no "consciousness" of "interests"; however, natural selection inevitably shapes this unconscious information so that it builds organisms that tend to behave exactly as they would if they were controlled by genetic design information that did have such conscious interests.
Second, the "interests" of distinct copies of genetic design information in different conspecific individuals are inevitably incompatible in a Malthusian world. Replication of one piece of design information generally occurs at the expense of the replication of a competing piece of conspecific design information. Equivalently, the interests of different pieces of conspecific design information are in "conflict".
Thus, as a result of the straightforward effects of natural selection, any two conspecific individuals who are not unambiguously, demonstrably built by the same design information will tend to behave as if they are serving these conflicting interests. In practice, close kin who share information recently inherited from common ancestors are the only conspecific individuals in which these conflicts of interest will be relatively attenuated.
More simply, we expect non-kin conspecific animals to behave as if they have intense conflicts of interest with one another. Though different biological subcultures take somewhat different views of some of the details of this problem (see Krebs and Davies 1993; Hauser 1996; Dugatkin 1997 for recent reviews), the fundamentals relating to communication are arguably straightforward, including the following.
The implications of this "conflict of interest problem" are vital to understanding non-human animal communication. Specifically, for example, we expect non-kin conspecifics to engage in "hostile manipulation" (Krebs and Dawkins 1984 ) --animal A will have an incentive to generate behavioral information influencing non-kin animal B in the interests of animal A and against the interests of animal B.
The effect of the prospect of hostile manipulation is that animals are highly adapted to ignoring and resisting attempts at manipulation by non-kin conspecifics. In practice, therefore, conspecifics exchange information essentially exclusively under one of three conditions as follows.
First is hard-to-fake (intrinsically reliable) information. For example, this includes unambiguous physical signals of size and strength such as the roaring of a lion or chest pounding by a male gorilla.
Second is the exchange of information between non-kin conspecifics who happen to lack a significant conflict of interest in some particular, recurring context (typically narrow and briefly persisting). For example, male and female moths must find one another in order to mate and reproduce. At the moment of mating they have a nearly pure confluence of interest. Thus, the female's pheromone signal is reliable and the male follows it.
Third is exchange of information between close genetic kin (unambiguously built by many pieces of the same design information) who are otherwise relatively unlikely to come into competition. The simplest (and classic) example of this pattern is the mammalian mother/pup-cub-calf-baby pair. Mammalian maternity is never in doubt (unlike paternity) and thus the mother and her offspring are unambiguously close kin. Moreover, the typical mammalian life cycle means that the young are commonly forced to disperse (or to assist the mother) when they reach maturity --so that the prospect of future competitive threat to the mother (actually to her design information) is modest.
Thus, mammalian mothers are expected to provide relatively extensive amounts of reliable, culturally transmitted information to their offspring. The diverse mammalian cultural traditions passed from mother to offspring (hunting techniques in cheetahs and fruit preferences in orangutans, for example) are presumptive manifestations of this predicted pattern of communication.
Another example is especially relevant here. The waggle dance of some honeybees is frequently invoked in discussions of non-human animal communication and its relevance to human language. However, the full social implications of this case are sometimes missed. Hymenopteran social cooperation in cases like the honeybee involves close genetic kinship and, thus, a confluence of interest.
2 If the conflict of interest problem is what limits non-human animal communication, we would expect members of individual beehives to exchange information. The waggle dance is apparently an example of the expected exchange.
All the above cases contain crucial insights for the human language problem. Communication can be highly adaptive but the scope or horizon for this adaptation is apparently strictly and universally limited by the conflict of interest problem. This will be the essential issue for us here.
It is also useful to notice several additional details. Even non-human animal communication in the face of conflicts of interest (threat in defense of territory, say) requires the communication of intent through behavior. Clearly, the same is true for at least some (and perhaps all) cases of non-human communication under conditions of confluence of interest (the waggle dance, for example). As has long been recognized, the waggle dance arguably consists of abstract, symbolic communication. However, even "iconic" signaling (again, threat, for example) should probably be regarded as symbolic --the iconic mimicry of aggreession "symbolizes" intent and intent is what is communicated.
Thus, we anticipate that non-human animals have all the capacities necessary for language, but on a scale more modest than elite human capabilities. Though the issue is intensely controversial among some professional linguists, there is considerable reason to believe that this is, in fact, the case. For example, non-human animals can apparently generate and comprehend simple (by elite human standards) combinatorial communicative gesture sets in either manual sign or vocal modes (see Patterson and Cohn, 1999, and Pepperberg, 1999, respectively) .
The complexity of hierarchically nested combinatoriality ("recursion") in human language has been suggested to be a uniquely human property (Hauser, et al., 2002) . However, there is reason to question this possibility. Non-human animals arguably parse highly dynamic, hierarchically nested combinatorial information sets of stupendous complexity (shifting "scenes") to allow their spectacularly precise adaptive responses to complex environments 3 . Further, elite non-human animal movement clearly implies the ability to generate complex, hierarchically nested, combinatorial movement sets (easily harnessed for symbolic gesture generation). On this biologically plausible view, humans and non-humans do not differ in their capacity for elite "recursion", but merely in the specific tasks these elite capacities are adaptively committed to.
Collectively, these observations support several crucial general conclusions. Non-human animal individuals exchange information in precisely the way we would expect if the conflict of interest problem were the sole limitation on the exchange of such information. Moreover, the non-human animal evidence argues that no other factor than solution of the conflict of interest problem and no new capability (ability to generate and comprehend "combinatorial symbolism" or a new level of individual intelligence, for example) need precede evolution of elite, symbolic communication. If a hypothetical animal should evolve the capacity to manage individual conflicts of interest on a large new scale, communication on the corresponding large new scale will evolve without the necessity to suppose any other pre-condition. This is the essential point to understand. It is apparently impossible to discuss the evolution of language without grasping this issue.
If this argument is correct, it follows that humans must be a very specific new kind of animal --the first animal to manage the conflict of interest problem on a large scale. The next three sections bring us to precisely this same conclusion along a different and highly illuminating path.
Conflicts of interest, kinship-independent social cooperation and human uniqueness
Humans have a large array of unique properties in addition to speech. These include unprecedented ecological dominance, remarkable cognitive/adaptive virtuosity and elaborate, ostentatiously public ethical/political/religious behaviors, among others. Moreover, even in the specific domain of communication, speech is only one element of a suite of uniquely elite human capabilities. For example, we also display unprecedented virtuosity at acquiring new manual skills by observation/imitation.
All uniquely human properties, without exception, are well explained as either elements or consequences of a single underlying cause --adaptation to vastly expanded social cooperation independent of close genetic kinship (Alexander 1987; Bingham 1999 and Bingham and Souza, monograph in preparation) . This uniquely human kinship-independent social cooperation, in turn, apparently has a single, simple underlying cause --unprecedented access to the capacity to coercively suppress/manage conflicts of interest inexpensively (Bingham 1999 (Bingham , 2000 Okada and Bingham, 2008; Bingham and Souza, monograph in preparation) . These are, of course, the very same conflicts of interest that apparently determine the scope and properties of non-human animal communication (preceding section).
The following section develops the underlying logic of this new theory of the origins of human uniqueness.
Death from a distance --conflict of interest, competition and cooperation
The game theoretic analyses of Okada and Bingham (2008) indicate that the following logic of evolution of kinship-independent social cooperation is coherent and compelling. 4 Moreover, alternative recent theories --including diverse group selection theories (reviewed in Sober and Wilson 1998; Gintis 2000) and an individual selection theory (Gardner and West 2004 ) -apparently lack adequate completeness and/or biological verisimilitude to be helpful to the language evolution problem.
On the theory we are reviewing here, the logic of animal social cooperation and the unique human expansion of that cooperation is as follows. Consider a set of non-kin individuals who cooperate to generate a gross individual benefit exceeding the costs of that cooperation --call them cooperators. In general, the benefits of such cooperative behaviors can also be commandeered by other individuals who failed to pay the initial cost of the cooperative enterprise --call these other individuals free riders. Moreover, individual free riders will do better adaptively than individual cooperators as a result of evading the costs of cooperation while partaking of its benefits. As a result, cooperation will not evolve where the opportunity for adaptive free riding exists. Equivalently, cooperation between individuals with conflicts of interest will not evolve. As we have already seen, this is precisely what we observe when we examine the communicative (and social) behavior of non-human animals.
This logic can be changed in one way --and, apparently, only in one wayas follows (Bingham, 1999; Okada and Bingham, 2008) . Non-human animal social cooperation is dominated by the fact that individuals who pursue noncooperative self-interest at the expense of possible future cooperative gain do better in short-term, head-to-head competition with individuals who make the opposite choice. The only way to alter this logic is to reverse the dictates of immediate, individual self-interest --rendering pursuit of cooperative gain the individually superior short-term adaptive choice.
This outcome can only be achieved when individually self-interested cooperators can impose a cost on non-cooperative individuals (free riders) that exceeds the benefit from free riding.
5 This can only occur, in turn, when imposing this cost on free riders is individually remunerative to self-interested cooperators. As far as we can tell from observation of human and non-human animal behavior, there is only a single viable way to impose such costs on a free rider --to inflict violence.
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These elementary theoretical and empirical constraints apparently allow only a single coherent solution (Okada and Bingham, 2008) . This solution has two parts. First, self-interested cooperators must directly recover the costs they incur (energy expended, time spent, risk of injury) while imposing costs, in turn, on would-be free riders. This implies that violence (and threat) must generally be directly remunerative. For example, ostracism might be preemptive, anticipatory --coercively forestalling free riding. Under these conditions, the costs of coercively ostracizing would-be free riders is recovered exclusively by active ostracizers when they retain the portion of the proceeds of cooperation that would otherwise have gone to the free rider. We refer to this logic in its most general form as compensated coercion 7 . Second, for preemptive coercion to be adaptively viable the costs of imposing coercive violence on would-be free riders must be less than the returns from ostracizing the free rider. This simple, transparent requirement appears to be the key to understanding human uniqueness. This cost-benefit requirement can apparently only be met in an animal in which many conspecific cooperators can simultaneously (synchronously) project violence (and, thus, credible threat) on a target individual. Moreover, the only known strategy that permits efficient synchronous projection of threat is the ability to inflict injury and even kill (and, thus, credibly threaten) conspecific adults from a substantial distance --remote or "stand-off" threatening strategies. [Visualize the threat of gunfire for the moment. We will return to the original evolved ancestral remote threatening capability below.] Most animals cannot inflict injury "remotely" and, instead, attack through direct contact ("proximally"). Proximally threatening animals do not have access to cost-effective (adaptive) coercive ostracism (below).
The logic of this synchronous threat requirement is easily accessible intuitively and is described in detail in Bingham (1999 and and Okada and Bingham (2008) . The gist is as follows. In remote threatening animals many individuals project potentially injurious action (again, visualize gunfire) simultaneously on a target individual. In contrast, in proximally threatening animals potential injury is projected alternatively by one or a small number of attackers in direct contact with the target. In both remote and proximal threateners each of n would-be coercive ostracizers absorbs (on average) 1/nth of the target's return threat (injury and potential injury) during a coercive episode. However, for remote threatening animals the target is absorbing in-coming threat n-times faster than for proximally threatening animals. This factor results in termination of the coercive episode (for example, by incapacitation of the target) n-times sooner.
As a consequence, the amount of cost (threat) to which each would-be remote ostracizing cooperator is (potentially) exposed is dramatically reduced (ntimes). In turn, the net benefit from coercive ostracism is correspondingly (and dramatically) improved. This makes coercive ostracism instantaneously individually self-interested behavior in a remote threatening animal but not in a proximally threatening one.
In actual practice, animals will evolve to anticipate costs and risks. Thus, each "rational player 8 " will usually elect to fight or stand down based on her (or his) anticipated costs and benefits. Full-blown violent episodes will be rare. Standing down for free riders means accepting ostracism. Standing down for cooperators means tolerating free riding.
The crucial point is that coercive ostracism in support of social cooperation is almost never a rational choice for a proximal threatener but is often a rational choice in a remote threatener. This is, of course, exactly what we see when we look for cooperation between non-human animals with conflicts of interest (including non-kin conspecifics). There is virtually none.
As we will see below, the original ancestral humans were apparently the first animals ever to evolve the capacity for elite projection of conspecific threat remotely. The magnitude of the reduction in costs of coercion for a remote threatening animal is enormous (above). Thus, it is reasonable to propose that coercive suppression of conspecific conflicts of interest is the fundamental human adaptive strategy in the same sense that flight is the fundamental adaptive strategy of birds, for example (Bingham 1999 (Bingham , 2000 Okada and Bingham, 2008) . Notice one point specifically. Our theory predicts that pursuit of individual selfinterest will lead inevitably to the evolution of kinship-independent social cooperation in any animal that happens to evolve (for whatever reason) the capacity to credibly threaten adult conspecifics remotely.
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It is beyond the scope of this manuscript to review all the relevant empirical evidence (see following section); however, note that this theoretical approach appears to give us a complete theory of human origins and properties and also generalizes to a robust theory of history (Bingham 1999 (Bingham , 2000 Okada and Bingham, 2008; Bingham and Souza, monograph in preparation) .
Finally, this theory predicts that we will engage in extensive mutual support among large sets of non-kin individuals, a pursuit we will subjectively experience as reflecting our (uniquely human) common humanity.
The fossil record of elite human throwing: the novel evolution of access to inexpensive conspecific coercion
Our theory predicts that the only animal in the history of our planet to evolve massive kinship-independent social cooperation should be precisely the only animal ever to have evolved the capacity for elite projection of threat against adult conspecifics remotely. Moreover, this one-of-a-kind animal should have evolved expanded kinship-independent social cooperation explosively after the evolution of elite remote threat.
Humans appear to be members of precisely this predicted animal lineage. We are the first animal ever to have evolved elite remote threat capability (in the form of uniquely human elite well-aimed, high-momentum throwing 10 ) and the first ever to have evolved massive kinship-independent social cooperation. [Our uniquely massive contemporary cooperation is self-evident -as is its "policing" with remote-threatening projectile weapons. See below for an approach to recognizing the origin of our unique social cooperation in the ancient human past.]
Moreover, the paleoanthropological record clearly indicates that very late pre-humans evolved elite throwing -followed very rapidly by the first symptoms of uniquely human social cooperation (earlier evidence is reviewed in Bingham 1999 and 2000; strong new evidence has been generated by the recent digs of early Homo remains in Dmanisi, Asian Georgia; excavations reviewed in Fischman 2005; reviewed in Bingham and Souza, monograph in preparation) .
In overview, this large body of fossil evidence strongly supports the picture our theory predicts and requires as follows. A late pre-human australopith was apparently presented with a new adaptive opportunity --"professional" hunting and/or power scavenging (systemically chasing dedicated hunters, like the big cats, off their kills, for example). This novel opportunity probably arose in local consequence of pervasive East African climate change encompassing the period at issue (Vrba, et al. 1995; Trauth, et al. 2005) .
As an animal with millions of years of history as a bipedal omnivore (and the body to match), this newly carnivorous late australopith was "forced to innovate" in quirky ways. These apparently included evolution of elite aimed throwing -as evidenced by the presence of missile-size stones (manuports) and by a series of radical alterations of the postcranial australopith skeleton to produce the characteristic Homo skeleton (reviewed in detail in Bingham 1999 Bingham , 2000 Bingham and Souza, monograph in preparation) .
As expected, these skeletal redesigns for throwing are systematic and pervasive. For example, the human hand has apparently been redesigned relative to the ancestral australopith hand to support the precise gripping and release of a baseball-size projectile. Moreover, the shoulder, pelvis and foot have also been redesigned as expected to support the quirky, explosively violent, whole-body torqueing motion of elite human throwing.
As predicted by our theory, the first indirect evidence for elite human throwing (fossil prey processed by hominids) is visible just before the first unambiguous members of Homo -beginning perhaps as early as 2.3 million years ago. The complete suite of human skeletal adaptations to elite throwing is clearly in place with the earliest full-blown members of Homo at ca. 1.8 million years ago.
This new elite-throwing animal did not remain merely another member of the extensive East African carnivore guild. Rather, very shortly after the evolution of elite throwing (around or shortly before 1.8 million years ago), this animal rapidly evolved an entirely new scale of social cooperation -as evidenced by brain enlargement and enhanced adaptive sophistication (as discussed below; also see Bingham 1999 Bingham , 2000 Bingham and Souza, monograph in preparation) .
Again, this is precisely what our theory predicts. Elite throwing is expected to have an "unintended" consequence. It should open an unprecedented adaptive opportunity --individually self-interested, compensated ostracism producing (as a by-product) massively, uniquely expanded social cooperation. With these insights in hand we can return to the evolution of human language with improved confidence.
Language in the land of elite information exchange
A longstanding evolutionary question has been, "If elite communication is such a good adaptive trick, why do only humans possess it?" We can now answer this question --directly and forcefully.
Conflicts of interest limit the adaptive scope of communication and humans are the first animal ever to be able to manage those conflicts of interest on a large scale.
This chapter could end here. We arguably have the answer we need and can now confidently approach speech as an element of a sophisticated biological adaptation of known evolutionary history and adaptive purpose. However, it is useful to go a little further --to enrich our intuition about the details of elite communication as a component of uniquely human social cooperation and of human speech as one subcomponent of this elite communication. More specifically, it is vital to grasp that "speech" is not a free-standing adaptation, but rather merely one element of a diverse array of adaptations to strategic information exchange on a new scale. This status of speech is both a central, falsifiable prediction of our new theory and, arguably, an empirical fact
We have extensive evidence that the behavioral sophistication of animals is limited by the amount of "cultural" information they have access to (Wrangham, et al., 1994; Whiten et al. , 1999, and van Schaik, et al. ,2003) . The amounts of non-cultural behavioral design information (genetic information and individual experience) available to an individual animal were apparently "maxedout" several hundred million years ago. In contrast, cultural information can continue to grow in amount indefinitely (under well-defined circumstances; below).
As we have seen, cultural information transmission is expected to be limited by the conflict of interest problem. Thus, we anticipate that a mammal evolving the capacity to manage the conflict of interest problem will gain access to vastly expanded amounts of --adaptively priceless --culturally transmitted behavioral design information. This new mammal would now learn from many rather than just from mom (close kin). Such an animal should show brain expansion 11 and increased behavioral sophistication as a result. Of course, from its very beginning ca. 1.8 million years ago, Homo displays brain expansion. Moreover, elite human stone tool manufacture and increased ecological range suggest improved behavioral sophistication from earlyon. Indeed, the consequences of unprecedented human social cooperation and expanded sharing of culturally transmitted information are apparently the sources of uniquely human cognitive virtuosity. Again, notice that this feature of human uniqueness emerges coincidently with access to cost-effective, compensated ostracism (elite throwing; above), as required if our theory is correct.
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How would an enlarged stream of cultural information have been transmitted in the earliest members of Homo? Initially, it would likely have been passed on in the same way as cultural information is transmitted in other mammals. The details of this process are still an active, contentious area of research (reviewed in Hauser 1996; Hayes and Galef 1996; Hurley and Chater 2005) , but we have a good grasp of some of the ways this is done. For example, cheetah mothers often hunt where their very young cubs can observe (from a tree perch, for example). As the cubs develop further, the mother will bring partially disabled live prey for them to practice on. Still later, she brings ever more healthy live practice prey until the cubs are ready to assume their adult roles as elite solitary speed hunters.
This mammalian pattern of cultural transmission presumably depends on diverse observational and learning skills. We don't yet know how best to parse this constellation of abilities in detail; however, capacities including "understanding intent" and "imitation" clearly play roles. Operationally, "facilitated" exposure and "guided" practice are also involved.
We predict that an animal that has new access to vastly increased amounts of cultural information (as a consequence of management of conflicts of interest) should develop this suite of skills on a new, more sophisticated level. Humans look just like such an animal, of course --arguably independently of language (sign or speech). For example, many humans can master a Mozart piano sonata (even the blind or non-speaking autistic savants) or scrimshaw (even the deaf) -but no non-human animal ever will.
There are many additional pieces of evidence that language is merely one element of a more complex "total package" of adaptations for uniquely human elite information exchange. One specific example will illustrate this general point -the social use of attention and the human eye. As Tomasello and others have emphasized (reviewed in Carpenter, et al. 1998) , humans have uniquely elite capacities for "joint" or "shared" attention --when two or more individuals focus by mutual consent on the same object or event. It is especially striking that the human eye has apparently been redesigned (with a bright white sclera) to make the human direction easily detectable in support of its salience (Kobayashi and Koshima 2001) .
Our new theoretical grasp also suggests new ways of thinking about emerging insights into the neurobiology of language. One example will illustrate this (reviewed in Corballis 2003 ; also see Rizzolatti, et al, 2000 and Arbib 2002) . For reasons presumably including ease of co-development and efficiency of function, areas of the brain with especially closely related functions are often spatially juxtaposed. Classic examples are the sensory and motor cortical homunculi and the mapping of the retina onto the primary visual cortex.
Uniquely human voluntary control of speech apparently requires ostensibly phylogenetically novel structures in the vicinity of Broca's area. Moreover, other elements in this immediate area probably represent phylogenetically older structures allowing the understanding of "intent" and "goal directed behavior" in others.
This striking observation has been taken as evidence that speech "borrowed" machinery previously designed for communication based on manual gesture (reviewed in Corballis 2002) . This suggestion may very well be correct. However, it might (also or alternatively) be the case that language and understanding manual intent map so closely because they are two sub-assemblies coordinately subserving the larger strategic objective of elite transmission of adaptively useful cultural information in all modalities 13 Lastly, Philip Tobias and Dean Falk originally proposed that human language-like behavior originated with the earliest members of Homo around or shortly before 1.8 million years ago (see Tobias 1987 for a review of the early history of this interpretation). This proposal is based on the emergence of a welldefined Broca's cap in fossil skull endocasts of the earliest members of Homo.
This view has been largely ignored by linguists. However, the new theory we are exploring here strongly suggests that Tobias and Falk were right about early emergence of elite language-like behavior.
14 Of course, we may never know whether the first enlargement of Broca's cap most directly supported elite cultural transmission by imitation, symbolic manual gesture, speech sensu stricto or some combination of these.
In summary, our theory accounts for human cognitive virtuosity and the evolution of elite communication in all modalities as direct consequences of the management of conflicts of interest for access to culturally transmitted information. 15 This adaptation is apparently part of the original, uniquely human suite emerging explosively at or shortly before 1.8 million years ago on this view. One last time for emphasis, note that human language appears to be merely one sub-element of an array of predictable adaptations to exploitation of this new access to information, an element likely to have been present is some substantial form from the dawn of Homo.
How might new theory help us?
New theories are initially evaluated on the basis of logical coherence, fit with empirical evidence, parsimony and scope. However, the real test of good theory is its ultimate fecundity. Earlier theories of language evolution have been notably sterile. It will be of interest to see if the theory reviewed here does better. It is useful to consider several likely directions for progress. First, we discussed above elements of the evolutionary logic of animal and human communication and of its underlying neurobiology. These considerations plainly suggest that human language involves no qualitatively new elements or features. Rather, human language apparently looks precisely as it should if it was produced by merely enhancing and redeploying universal animal devices and properties.
It is important to be emphatic. On this theory there is no reason whatever to suppose that any qualitatively new neural/cognitive capability 16 was necessary to initiate the evolution of human language (or communication more generally). Indeed, such proposals are arbitrary and gratuitous on this view. The only qualitatively new, rate-limiting step in the evolution of human language was the management of the conflict of interest problem on our theory.
Second, the conclusion in the preceding paragraph has a potentially useful corollary. The structure of human language is unlikely to reflect the structure of any new peripheral add-on widgets. Rather, the structure of language is very likely to reflect the recruitment of the underlying structure of the ancient ancestral animal mind to the task of communication. From this perspective, linguistics can be viewed as one of the central approaches of the larger universal cognitive sciences enterprise, rather than as the domain of a small group of narrow specialists.
If this view of the origins of human language is correct, the labors of empirical vocal and sign linguists (see Pinker and Jackendoff, 2005, and Aronoff , et al., 2008, respectively) are likely to bear phenomenally rich fruits.
Endnotes
1 See Terkel (1996) for a particularly clear, unambiguous analysis of rodent cultural transmission.
2 See Hauser (1996) for a review of the waggle dance. A small level of coercive suppression of conflicts of interest through "worker policing" is probably also involved here (reviewed in Barron 2001) . The form of this policing is as follows. Each worker eats the eggs of other (mostly halfsister) workers because the half-nephews that would result from these eggs are less closely related to the non-laying half-sister than are the queen-laid male eggs (brothers to the workers). Each worker's best available adaptive choice is to raise brothers, rather than their own more closely related sons. Under these conditions, the bee colony remains stable over prolonged periods of time --producing the large-scale, cooperative enterprise we are familiar with. Conflicts of interest between individuals are trumped by their effective (and enforced) confluence of interest.
